A decision maker is engaged in a repeated interaction with Nature. The objective of the decision maker is to guarantee to himself the average payo¤ as large as the best-reply payo¤ to Nature's empirical distribution of play, no matter what Nature does. The decision maker with perfect recall can achieve this objective by a simple better-reply strategy. In this paper we demonstrate that the relationship between perfect recall and bounded recall is not straightforward: The decision maker with bounded recall may fail to achieve this objective, no matter how long recall he has and no matter what better-reply strategy he employs.
Introduction
In every (discrete) period of time a decision maker (for short, Agent) makes a decision and, simultaneously, Nature selects a state of the world. Agent receives a payo¤ which depends on both his action and the state. Nature's behavior is ex-ante unknown to Agent, it may be as simple as an i.i.d. environment or as sophisticated as a strategic play of a rational player. Agent's objective is to select a sequence of decisions which guarantees to him the average payo¤ as large as the best-reply payo¤ against Nature's empirical distribution of play, no matter what Nature does. A behavior rule of Agent which ful…lls this objective is called universally consistent 1 : the rule is "consistent"if it is optimized against the empirical play of Nature; the word "universally"refers to its applicability to any behavior of Nature.
A range of problems can be described within this framework. One example, known as the on-line decision problem, deals with predicting a sequence of states of Nature, where at every period t Agent makes a prediction based on information known before t. The classical problem of predicting the sequence of 0's and 1's with "few" mistakes has been a subject of study in statistics, computer science and game theory for more than 40 years. In a more general problem, Agent's goal is to predict a sequence of states of Nature at least as well as the best expert from a given pool of experts 2 (see Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994; Freund and Schapire, 1996; Cesa-Bianchi et al., 1997; Vovk, 1998) . Another example is no-regret learning in game-theory. A regret 3 of Agent for action a is his average gain had he played constant action a instead of his actual past play; Agent's goal is to play a sequence of actions so that he has "no regrets" (e.g., Hannan, 1957; Fudenberg and Levine, 1995; Foster and Vohra, 1999; Mas-Colell, 2000, 2001; Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2003) .
1 The term "universal consistency" is due to Fudenberg and Levine (1995) . 2 By an "expert"we understand a given deterministic on-line prediction algorithm.
Thus, "to do as well as the best expert" means to make predictions, on average, as close to the true sequence of states as the best of the given prediction algoritms.
3 This paper deals with the simplest notion of regret known as external (or unconditional ) regret (see, e.g., Foster and Vohra, 1999) .
Action a is called a better reply to Nature's empirical play if Agent could have improved upon his average past play had he played action a instead of what he actually played in the past. In this paper, we assume that in every period Agent plays a better reply to Nature's past play. The betterreply play is a natural adaptive behavior of an unsophisticated, myopic, nonBayesian decision maker. The class of better-reply strategies encompasses a big variety of behavior rules, such as …ctitious play and smooth …ctitious play 4 ; Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) 's "no-regret"strategy of playing an action with probability proportional to the regret for that action; some forms of the logistic (or exponential-weighted) algorithms used in both game theory and computer science (see Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994; Freund and Schapire, 1996; Cesa-Bianchi et al., 1997; Vovk, 1998) ; the polynomial (l p -norm) "noregret"strategies and potential-based strategies of Hart and Mas-Colell (2001) (see also Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2003) .
Agent is said to have m-recall if he is capable of remembering the play of m last periods; the empirical frequency of Nature's play to which Agent "betterreplies" is the simple average across the time interval not exceeding the last m periods. A special case of Agent with perfect recall (m = 1) is well studied in the literature, and universally consistent better-reply strategies of Agent with perfect recall are well known (see Hannan, 1957; Foster and Vohra, 1999; Mas-Colell, 2000, 2001; Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2003) . The case of bounded-recall strategies is considered by Lehrer and Solan (2008) whose work is very close to our paper and will be discussed later on. There is also an extensive literature on bounded-recall strategies (e.g., Lehrer, 1988; Aumann and Sorin, 1989; Lehrer, 1994; Watson, 1994) and, more generally, strategies implemented by …nite automata (e.g., Aumann, 1981; Rubinstein, 1986; BenPorath, 1993; Neyman, 1998; Neyman and Okada, 2000) has an "-universally consistent strategy in this family. We prove the following statement.
There is no family of bounded-recall better-reply strategies which is asymptotically universally consistent.
The statement is proven by a counterexample. We construct a game where Agent with m-recall is allowed to play any better-reply strategy; Nature is assumed to play the …ctitious play with m-recall, i.e., in every period it plays the best reply to Agent's average play over the last m periods. Thus, given an initial history and strategies of Agent and Nature, the joint play constitutes a …nite Markov chain whose state space is the set of all histories of length m. We show that there exists a closed set of states of the Markov chain (which forms a cyclical play over the action pro…les in the game), where in every state the average payo¤ of Agent (over the last m periods) is bounded away from the best-reply payo¤ by a uniform bound for every …nite m. Intuitively, the reason for a cyclical behavior is that in every period t Agent learns a new observation, a pair (a t ; ! t ), and forgets another observation, (a t m ; ! t m ). An addition of the new observation shifts, in expectation, Agent's average payo¤ (across the last m periods) in a "better"direction, however, the loss of (a t m ; ! t m ) shifts it in an arbitrary direction. Since the magnitude of the two e¤ects is the same, 1=m, it may lead to a cyclical behavior of the play. Note that with unbounded recall, m = 1, the second e¤ect does not exist: Agent does not forget anything, and, consequently, a cyclical behavior is not possible.
A setting very similar to ours is considered by Lehrer and Solan (2008) , who also assume bounded recall of a player, 5 however, they do not constrain the player to play a better reply to the opponents' average play over the full history within the recall limit. Lehrer and Solan construct an "-universally consistent strategy where the player periodically "wipes out" his memory.
The idea of their strategy is that the player divides time into blocks of size equal to her recall length m, and plays in every period a better-reply to the opponents' average play within the current block, behaving as if she recalls only the history of the current block. In contrast, in this paper we prove that any better-reply strategy to the average play over the full history within the recall limit need not be "-universally consistent.
The comparison of our result with Lehrer and Solan's leads to the following conclusion: sometimes Agent can be better o¤ by not using, or deliberately forgetting some information about the past. The analysis of the situation shows that in periods t = 1; : : : ; m, when Agent only accumulates information without forgetting anything, he can approach the best reply to the opponent's average play with rate 1= p t. However, from period t = m + 1 on, Agent's memory is full, and in every period he forgets the oldest observation, which can drive his average payo¤ away from the best reply and get him locked in a non-optimal cyclical play. In this situation, periodic restarts "from scratch"
help Agent to get out of this "vicious"cycle.
Preliminaries
In every discrete period of time t = 1; 2; : : : Agent chooses an action, a t , from a …nite set A of actions, and Nature chooses a state, ! t , from a …nite set of states. Let u : A ! R be Agent's payo¤ function; u(a t ; ! t ) is Agent's payo¤ at period t. Denote by h t := ((a 1 ; ! 1 ); : : : ; (a t ; ! t )) the history of play up to t. Let H t = (A ) t be the set of histories of length t and let H = S 1 t=1 H t be the set of all histories.
5 In fact, Lehrer and Solan (2008) deal with a more general problem of the set approachability by bounded-recall strategies or by …nite automata in vector-payo¤ games. 6 See Section 6 for more details.
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Let p : H ! (A) and q : H ! ( ) be behavior rules of Agent and Nature, respectively. For every period t, we will denote by p t+1 := p(h t ) the next-period mixed action of Agent and by q t+1 := q(h t ) the next-period distribution of states of Nature. A pair (p; q) and an initial history h t 0 induce a probability measure over H t for all t > t 0 .
We assume that Agent does not know q, that is, he plays against an unknown environment. We consider better-reply behavior rules, according to which Agent plays actions which are "better"than his actual past play against the observed empirical behavior of Nature. Formally, for every a 2 A and every period t de…ne R m t (a) 2 R + as the average gain of Agent had he played a over the last m periods instead of his actual past play. Namely, let
We will refer to R De…nition 2. Behavior rule p is a better-reply rule if for every period t,
The focus of our study is how well better-reply rules perform against an un-known, possibly, hostile environment. To assess performance of a behavior rule, we use Fudenberg and Levine (1995) 's criterion of "-universal consistency de…ned below.
Agent's behavior rule p is said to be consistent with q if Agent's average payo¤ (over the past that he remembers) tends to be at least as large as the best-reply payo¤ to the average empirical play of Nature which plays q.
De…nition 3. Let " > 0. A behavior rule p of Agent with m-recall is "-consistent with q if for every initial history h t 0 there exists T such that for
A behavior rule p is consistent with q if it is "-consistent with q for every " > 0.
Let Q be the class of all behavior rules. Agent's behavior rule p is said to be universally consistent if it is consistent with any behavior of Nature.
De…nition 4. A behavior rule p of Agent with m-recall is ("-) universally consistent if it is ("-) consistent with q for every q 2 Q.
Perfect recall and prior results
Suppose that Agent has perfect recall (m = 1). This case has been extensively studied in the literature, starting from Hannan (1957) , who proved the following theorem.
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Theorem 1 (Hannan, 1957) . There exists a better-reply rule which is universally consistent.
8 Pr (p;q;h) [E] denotes the probability of event E induced by strategies p and q, and initial history h. 9 The statements of theorems of Hannan (1957) and Hart and Mas-Colell (2001) presented in this section are su¢ cient for this paper, though the authors obtained stronger results. Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) showed that the following rule is universally consistent:
arbitrary, otherwise.
(1)
According to this rule, Agent assigns probability on action a proportional to his regret for a; if there are no regrets, his play is arbitrary. This result is based on Blackwell (1956)'s Approachability Theorem. We shall refer to p in
(1) as the Blackwell strategy.
The above result has been extended by Hart and Mas-Colell (2001) as follows.
A behavior rule p is called a (stationary) regret-based rule if for every period t Agent's next-period behavior depends only on the current regret vector. That is, for every history h t , the next-period mixed action of Agent is a function
Hart and Mas-Colell proved that among better-reply rules, all "well-behaved"stationary regret-based rules are universally consistent.
Theorem 2 (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2001 ). Suppose that a better-reply rule p satis…es the following:
(i) p is a stationary regret-based rule given for every t by p t+1 = (R 1 t ); and (ii) there exists a continuously di¤erential potential P :
Then p is universally consistent.
The class of universally consistent behavior rules (or "no regret" strategies) which satisfy conditions of Theorem 2 includes the logistic (or exponential adjustment) strategy given for every t and every a 2 A by
; > 0, used by Littlestone and Warmuth (1994) , Freund and Schapire (1996) , Cesa-Bianchi et al. (1997) , Vovk (1998) Numbers implies that in every period Agent obtains an expected payo¤ which is " m -close to the best reply payo¤ to q with probability at least 1 " m , with " m ! 0 as m ! 1.
A negative result
In this section we demonstrate that Agent with bounded recall cannot guarantee his play to be "-optimized against the empirical play of Nature, no matter how large recall length he has and no matter what better-reply rule he uses. Let M = f4j + 2jj = 2; 3; : : :g. For every m 2 M , let p m be an arbitrary better-reply rule, and let q m be the …ctitious play with m-recall. Namely, denote by u N the payo¤ function of Nature as given by Fig. 1, and H m the set of states generated along the following cycle (Fig. 2) .
Fig. 2. Closed cycle of Markov chain P m
The cycle has four phases. In two phases labeled (U,R) and (D,R), the play is deterministic, and the duration of each phase is exactly m=2 periods. In the two other phases, the play may randomize between two pro…les (one written above the other), and the duration of each phase is m=2 or m=2 + 1 periods.
First, we show that this cycle is closed in P m , i.e., h The proof is in the Appendix.
Next, we show that the expected regrets generated by this cycle are bounded away from zero by a uniform bound for all m. The proof is in the Appendix. Lemmata 1 and 2 entail the statement of Theorem 4.
Remark 1 In the proof of Theorem 4, Nature plays the …ctitious play with m-recall, which is a better-reply strategy for every m. Consequently, Agent with bounded recall cannot guarantee a nearly optimized behavior even if Nature's behavior is constrained to be in the class of better-reply strategies.
Remark 2 The result can be strengthened as follows. Suppose that whenever Agent has no regrets, then he plays a fully mixed action, i.e.,
The next lemma shows that if in game Agent plays a better-reply strategy p m which satis…es (2) and Nature plays the …ctitious play with m-recall, then the Markov chain P m converges to the cycle H m C regardless of an initial history. Thus the above negative result is not an isolated phenomenon, it is not peculiar to a small set of initial histories. , and Nature's best reply is R, thus, q t+1 (R) = 1. The following play is deterministic, alternating between (UR) and (DR) forever.
Concluding remarks
We conclude the paper with a few remarks.
1. Why does the better-reply play of Agent with bounded recall fail to exhibit a (nearly) optimized behavior (against Nature's empirical play)?
For every a 2 A denote by v t (a) the one-period regret for action a, v t (a) = u(a; ! t ) u(a t ; ! t );
k=t m v k , we can consider how the regret vector changes from period t 1 to period t:
Since the play at period t is a better reply to the empirical play over time interval t m; : : : ; t 1, the term 2. The following behavior rule was introduced by Lehrer and Solan (2008) .
Suppose that Agent has bounded recall m. Divide the time into blocks of size m: the …rst block contains periods 1; : : : ; m, the second block contains periods m + 1; : : : ; 2m, etc. Let n(t) be the …rst period of the current block, 11 n(t) = m dt=me + 1. Agent's regret for action a 2 A is de…ned bŷ
That is,R m t (a) is Agent's average increase in payo¤ had he played a constantly instead of his actual past play within in the current block. LetR Notice that the induced probability distribution over histories within every block is identical to the probability distribution over histories within …rst m periods in the model with a perfect-recall agent. The Blackwell (1956)'s 11 dxe denotes a number x rounded up to the nearest integer. 12 Note that the described rule is non-statonary, as p m t+1 actually depends on the starting period of the current block. Lehrer and Solan (2008) also construct a stationary rule of the same kind, where the beginning of the block is "marked" by a speci…c sequence of actions which is unlikely to occur in the course of a regular better-reply play.
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Approachability Theorem (which is behind the result of Hart and Mas-Colell (2000) on the universal consistency of p m ) gives the rate of convergence of 1= p t, hence, within each block Agent can approach 1= p m-best reply to the empirical distribution of Nature's play.
This result is a surprising contrast to the counterexample in Section 5. It shows that Agent can achieve a better average payo¤ by not using, or deliberately forgetting some information about the past. Indeed, according to the example presented in Section 5, if Agent uses full information that he remembers, the play may eventually enter the cycle with far-from-optimal behavior. A deliberate forgetting of past information may help Agent to get out of this cyclical behavior.
3. Hart and Mas-Colell (2001) used a slightly di¤erent notion of better reply.
Consider Agent with perfect recall and de…ne for every period t and every
Note that R 
The de…nition of a better-reply rule used in this paper is the same as Hart and
Mas-Colell's, except that the word "weak" is replaced by "strict"; formally,
These notions are very close, and one does not imply the other. To the best of our knowledge, all speci…c better-reply rules mentioned in the literature satisfy both notions of better reply. It can be veri…ed that our results remain intact with either notion.
Fact 1. For every period t,
Proof. Note that
Since Nature plays …ctitious play, at t + 1 it selects ! t+1 2 argmax
Note that ties never occur, since m 2 M and t is a multiple of , thus by Fact
hence a t+1 =D. Further, in every period t+j, j = 1; : :
is played and (a t+j m ; ! t+j m ) = (U,M) disappears from the history. At period
There are no regrets, and therefore both (U,L) and (D,L) may occur at t+k+1. 
If (U,L) occurs, then
and (U,L) occurs in periods k + 3; : : : ; 2k + 1, until we
takes form (a). Finally, if at t + k + 2 (D,L) occurs, then
and (U,L) occurs in periods k + 3; : : : ; 2k + 2, until we
, and then k (U,L)'s, i.e., it takes form (c). , and (D,L) is deterministically played
After that, (U,L) is played in periods k +2; : : : ; 2k +2, until we reach t+2k+2 = 
Thus, (U,R) is played for the next m=2 = 2k + 1 periods, until we reach . Therefore,
, therefore, in periods t j and t + j the regret for D must be at least R m t (D) 2j=m. Since the duration of every cycle is at most 2m + 2, the average regret for D during the cycle is at A-3 Proof of Lemma 3.
We shall prove that, regardless of the initial history, some event H m E H m occurs in…nitely often, and whenever it occurs, the process reaches the cycle, H m C , within at most 2m periods with strictly positive probability. It follows that the process reaches the cycle with probability 1 from any initial history. After that U must be played with probability 1 in every period j 0 = t j+1; : : :, until frequency of U increases above , which is required to have ! t+j =M. The second part of the fact is proved analogously. , that is, U occurs at most k times in the history at t 1, thus z t (U,M) z t 1 (U,M) 
